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WHAT IS LEGAL PHILOSOPHY * 
he purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship 
of philosophy to law: to acquaint the reader with the 
subject matter of legal philosophy by explaining what 
in law attracts the ohilosophic mind and how philosophic 
investigation of the law may inform both disciplines. These brief 
remarks should not be construed as exhaustive. Indeed, philosophy of 
law has changed so in method and substance in the last few years that 
any attempt to define its boundaries at this time would no doubt prove 
at a later date to be a source of embarrassment. In what follows I 
wil1 discuss some of both the traditional and more recent concerns of 
legal philosophy. In doing so, I hope to shed at least indirect light 
on the role of philosophy in academic legal studies programs. 
Of all academic disciplines, philosophy is perhaps the most funda-
mental. By that I mean that philosophy is concerned with the conceptual 
foundations, the building blocks, of our claims about the world in a 
way in which other disciplines are not. The point is illustrated best 
by the very subject matter of the traditional areas of philosophic 
inquiry. The domain of epistemology, the theory of knowledge, for 
example, is marked by two questions: (1) What do we know? and (2} How 
do we come to know it? What distinguishes the individual who knows 
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something to be true from one who correctly believes something to be
true, yet does not know it to be so? Is knowledge systematic, and,
if so, how can we avoid Cartesian skepticism about its foundations?
Metaphysics, which alo-ig with epistemology forms the core of philosophy,
involves taking inventory of the elements in the universe; it is the
study of what there is. Is a universe already "overpopulated" with
tables, chairs and people capable of supporting, among other things,
facts, states of affairs and numbers. Questions of ontology and knowl-
edge lead one naturally to Philosophy of Science which is concerned to
explicate the nature of explanation, prediction, theory, evidence,
confirmation, causation and nature itself. Finally, whether moral
judgments can be tested or verified in +he manner of scientific hypoth-
eses is one of the dominant themes in Meta Ethics; while the search
for the standard of right or just action dominates Normative Ethics
in general and as these questions apply to the State, Political Philoso-
phy in particular.
Aspects of recent work in legal philosophy share the same concerns
with concept elucidation that has motivated much of Anglo/American
philosophy since World War II. Nowhere in legal philosophy are the
conceptual concerns of abstract philosophy exemplified better than in
analytic jurisprudence. The question is: What is law, or what makes
law, law? No doubt the search for the essence of law and the necessary
and sufficient conditions for the existence of a legal system leads one
to chart other grounds on the normative landscape. If we can discover
the nature of law, we can thereby isolate a principle by which we can
distinguish law from morality--if (as the Positivists claim) the two
are distinguishable. An account of the nature of law and of obligation
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under the law is essential to evaluating arguments on whether t;,ere
is a prima facie moral obligation to obey law. Ultimately, questions
about the alleged moral obligation to obey law are questions of the
legitimacy of authority and of the State generally. So, while it may
be useful for the sake of analysis to define narrowly the issues of
analytic jurisprudence, it would be unforgivable to overlook the manner
in which a theory of law is a component of a more comprehensive moral
and political theory.
1
One can distinguish among at least four general categories of
answers to the question: What is Law? These are the answers given
by (1) The Legal Positivist;2 (2) The Legal Realist;3 (3) The Natural
Law Theorist;4 and (4) The Entitlement Theorist.5  In each case the
theorist wants to determine when law exists and to account for its
"binding" power; that is, how the law imposes obligations on its citizens
and why, in obeying the law, citizens view themselves as being obligated
to do so.
For the Natural Law theorist, validity of law is a matter of thP
law's content, of its substance. Aquinas, for example, held that a
bad (immoral) law is no law at all, that it imposes no legal obligations.
Conversely, for law to be binding, it must have moral worth. Positive
law is for the natural lawyer rooted in moral law and obligatory for
that reason alone.
6
The basic tenet of Legal Positivism is that the validity of law
is in no way a matter of morality.7 Thus, the Positivist must provide
an account of the binding power of valid law without having recourse
to moral principle. The Positivist Austin held the view that law consists
in the general commands (or orders) backed by threatened sanctions
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(punishments) of a sovereign properly so-called. A sovereign properly
so-called is one who is both internally supreme and externally independ-
ent. An internally supreme and externally independent sovereign is one
who has the general habit of obedience from his citizens and who is
not himself in the habit of obeying anyone. The habit of obedience 
is
secured in the end by the specter of sanction for noncompliance.
According to Austin, the validity of law is a matter of form. It
is a question of whose command, not one of the subject matter or substance
of the command. "Law" is valid if it is the sovereign's command. But
can a formal test of validity give rise to an account of obligation?
For Austin the obligatory force of law is derived from the threatened
evil that is likely to attend noncompliance. But it is easy to see
that even where law imposes sanctions for noncompliance, the penalty
is a secondary motive for compliance. Acceptance of the rule of law
as a standard of behavior is the primary motive for acting in accordance
with it. Where internal acceptance fails, the sanctions are imposed
both to penalize the transgressor and to promote general compliance.
In addition, as H. L. A. Hart rightly notes, a citizenry that bestows
upon its sovereign the habit of obedience need not be acting from a
sense of obligation. Indeed, when one acts under threat--as does the
bank teller in handing over money to the gunman--one acts in a fashion
that contrasts with acting from obligation. One acts in such cases
under compulsion or duress; one obeys; one is obliged to act in the
required way; yet one does not appear to act as if one were under an
obligation to do so.8 Obligations devolve, for example, from promises
and contracts, not from threats.
9
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What we need is an account of the legitimacy of the sovereign's
commands so that we may account for their binding force. But in Austin
the sovereign's legitimacy is a function of his having secured the habit
of obedience; and his securing that is a matter of (using the term somewhat
loosely) force, not legitimacy. (I have argued elsewhere that Austin
does have another argument for the sovereign's legitimacy, but it is
on, which undermines his claim to Positivism.)
In Hart, the obligatory nature of law is explained in part by laws
consisting in rules rather than in habits of obedience 
to commands.10
Rules are normative as well as descriptive. They specify how one should
act and thus provide both good reasons for acting in a particular way
and grounds for criticism in the event of divergence or noncompliance.
Individuals who follow rules accept them as standards of conduct and
evaluation and it is this process of internalization that makes law
binding. Law exists when individuals in a community accept rules as
providing them with both reasons for acting in certain specified ways
and grounds for criticizing others whose conduct diverges from the norm.
But law may exist even in the absence of widespread internalization. The
question is how might Hart account for the obligatory aspect of valid
law in the event of a breakdown in the process of internalization?
At this point Hart's position becomes somewhat more complex. First,
he introduces the concept of internal validity. In the above paragraph
we talked about the validity of law as being a matter of the practice
of a coiinunity, in particular, their employing the rules as laws, that
is, as standards of action and evaluation. The question whether such
rules are laws is answered by observing the social practices. In con-
trast, one can imagine a formal internal system of validity analogous
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perhaps to a closed logical system with its initial axioms and derived
theorems. In such a system, the validity of particular theorems is
an internal question answerable only by checking the theorem against
axioms. Similarly, if a legal system has an ultimate rule, an axiom
of sorts, the validity of rules under it is determined by seeing if
the rule in question is subsumable under the ultimate rule. Thus, a
legal system may have both an internal and external test of validity.
Second, in order for there to be an internal test of validity
we must distinguish between two kinds of legal rules. For Hart, this
rls12
is the distinction between primary and secondary rules. Primary
rules, like Austin's Commands, impose duties. Secondary rules confer
power on authorities either to change law or to adjudicate it. Among
the secondary rules of a legal system is the rule of recognition, the
ultimate rule of the system. While other secondary rules enable indi-
viduals to make, alter or judge law, the rule of recognition is the
test by which the internal validity of other rules is determined. In
Hart's view, the rule of recognition is a secondary rule though it
does not actually confer power. Law exists when there is a union of
primary and secondary rules: where there are rules that impose duties
and a rule of recognition for determining which subordinate rules con-
stitute valid law.
The argument that law is binding involves the application of both
internal and external tests. The validity of particular tules is deter-
mined internally by appealing to the rule of recognition. B ause it
is the ultimate rule, the validity of the rule of recognition c be
determined only in practice.13 It is valid if those who apply it,
especially judges and legislators, internalize it, that is, adopt it
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as binding upon them. If the rule is valid and binding, then so are
all those particular (primary) rules formally valid under it.
How far Hart advances the Positivists' cause depends on whether
he has provided a formal account of legal validity that can explain
the binding nature of law without recourse to a moralistic account of
their acceptance or internalization.
Jurisprudes wedded to the Natural Law tradition reject all Positiv-
ist efforts to explain the force af law. Positivists fail to "derive"
law from morality, an indispensable ingredient in a citizen's obligation
to obey law. Natural Law theorists disagree, however, about the point
at which law must be rooted in moral principle in order for it to impose
obligations. We can distinguish between two categories of Natural Law
Theory: Substantive and Procedural. Under the former, legal validity
is a matter of substance. 14 A law's validity (at least in part) depends
on whether its command is a moral one; whether it requires one to act
in morally permissible ways.
Procedural Natural Lawyers do not maintain that all or even most
laws must be rooted in moral standards for law to exist. Lon Fuller,
the staunchest advocate of this position, maintains that law is an activity
with "its own morality," the morality of law making; thus the term
"procedural natural law theory." For law to be valid, it must be the
output of a process that adheres to principles of, among others, openness,
consistency, plausibility, clarity and coherence. To the extent the
process complies with these canons, valid law exists. The validity of
particular rules is then in part a question of how well the system
generally complies with its own "inner morality."
Ronald Dworkin has taken both the Positivists and the Natural
Lawyers to task. His argument against Fuller is simply that while
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adherence to Fuller's canons may be necessary for law to exist, there
is no reason to believe that the canons themselves state moral 
principles. 15
Failure to comply with one of them may be a strategic flaw in lawmaking
though not a moral onc. To support his claim he cites the canon which
requires good draftsmanship. Poor draftsmanship need not be morally
blameworthy, so it follows that the canon requiring good draftsmanship
cannot be a moral one.16 However, while negligent carelessness may not
be immoral, intentionally shoddy draftsmanship may well be. Moreover,
we can interpret Fuller not as claiming that each canon states a moral
requirement of lawmaking, but as arguing that adherence to these principles
tends to promote certain moral virtues of legal systems, e.g., openness,
coherence, consistency and the like. Indeed, one could argue that in
the absence of such virtues, it would be hard to imagine the internali-
zation of law necessary on Hart's view to account for its obligatory
nature. The acceptance of law depends on its possessing at least these
moral virtues.
Dworkin is better known for his criticism of the Positivists. For
both Austin and Hart, legal validity is a matter of form, not substance.
Dworkin denies that any such noncontestable exhaustive standard of
validity exists. His argument is based on considering "hard cases."
17
A hard case is one in which judges cannot mechanically reach decisions
by applying the rules whose validity has already been determined by
the appropriate test to the facts of individual cases. Typically, hard
cases arise when no settled rule seems to apply, or when the rule which
appears to apply is vague so that we can't determine if the particular
case actually falls under it, 18 or if two conflicting rules each appear
to apply equally well to the fact situation. Ex hypothesi, in resolving
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these cases, the judges cannot appeal to the rules alone. Factors
other than formally valid law must be decisive in rendering decisions
in these cases. In such cases, judges must make, rather than find law.
Under the Positivist definition of what is law--commitment to the rule
of recognition--principles decisive in hard cases are not themselves
law.
If one adopts the Positivists position, there is no best or correct
decision as a matter of law in hard cases. It follows that the litigants
in such cases are not entitled to a particular decision. In contrast,
Dworkin suggests that we begin analysis not with the rule of recognition
and the authority of individual judges to go beyond the law to reach
decisions, but with the rights of individual litigants. If litigants
are entitled to the best decision as a matter of law, then the judge
is not free to exercise discretion, but is obligated instead to determine
which litigant has the legal right in every case. Such a search may
be informed by "black letter law" valid under the rule of recognition, but
in hard cases, that won't suffice. The judge must be informed by moral
principle as well; and these principles of political morality are part
of the law, though no rule of recognition identifies them as such.
Where they are decisive in determining which litigant ought to win,
principles of political morality are part of the law. Principles,
unlike rules, have the dimension of weight. How much weight a principle
has in a particular case depends upon its entrenchment in other cases,
preambles to legislation and the like.
Numerous questions can be raised about Dworkin's views; whether
in theory one could construct a rule of recognition for moral principles
as well as for rules, thus rendering even Dworkin a Positivist 
of sorts;19
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whether just because a principle becomes a basis for making a judgment
in law, the principle itself is a matter of law, and more. But a thor-
ough review of Dworkin's subtle work is best left for another occasion.
The foregoing overview of some of the positions that have been
taken on the question of the definition of law,, the basis for its binding
effect and the basis on which decisions can be made in law, suggests the
work of legal philosophy on perennial questions. In some ways, they
epitomize the struggle that has been waged across time between letter
and spirit, between rule and reason, between rule and principle for
rule, or somewhat more grandiosely, between philosophy and law.
II
The most interesting work in legal philosophy is currently being
done on problems relating to Responsibility. Early works in legal
responsibility focused on questions in meta ethics, usually on the
justification of punishment and the role of excuses in a theory of
responsibility. The simple truth is that most of these efforts were
sadly uninformed by prevailing legal theory and practice. It was not
uncommon for moral philosophers unfamiliar with the nature of the crimi-
nal sanction, tort liability or contractual obligation to pronounce
judgment on the morality of criminal, tort and contractual liability
respectively.
There have, however, always been exceptions to this sad rule of
ill-informed speculation. H. L. A. Hart, Joel Feinberg, Herbert Morris
and Richard Wasserstrom have taken a more interdisciplinary approach,
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anc more philosophers have taken law degrees or have "done time" in
law schools. Some philosophers have studied sociology, criminology,
economics and other disciplines.
The truly interdisciplinary character of legal philosophy is illus-
trated by work in tort liability. In torts, liability is generally
determined by applying the criterion of fault, i.e. an injurer is liable
for harms caused by his fault; a victim is entitled to recover only for
those harms caused by another's fault. The rule of fault liability has
been abandoned in some cases failing under the rule of strict liability
20
which states that fault is not a condition to responsibility or compen-
sation.
The allocation of personal losses on the basis of fault in some
cases but not in others leads to a number of fundamental issues: What
does the standard of fault in torts amount to? What is its relation
to moral fault? What is its relation to the standard of criminal guilt?
How might one justify fault as a standard of liability? Is that a
matter of justice, economics, or something else entirely? If imposing
liability on the basis of fault is a matter of justice, then liability
in the absence of fault must be unjust. But is it?
Our first intuitions about responsibility may turn out to be parti-
ally indefensible. Justice seems to require that a person be at fault
before bearing the costs of injuries to another. Were this intuition
sound, no-fault accident laws and strict liability in general would
surely be immoral. But as Coleman 21 and Calabresi 22 have argued, no
principle of justice has as its consequence the rule of fault liability.
In particular, Coleman points out that while principles of retributive
justice may require that those at fault be penalized and compensatory
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justice may require that those victimized by another's fault be compen-
sated, there is no single principle of justice which requires either
that the victim's recompense come from his injurer or that the injurer's
pen&lty take the form of his having to render compensation to his victim.
But to argue that fault liability is not required as a matter of justice
is not to suggest that the fault principle is totally indefensible.
Similarly, to show that strict liability is not necessarily unjust is
not to argue that in all cases strict liability would satisfy our stand-
ards of justice.
The focal point of all analysis into tort liability is Holmes'
famous remark that in the absence of a good reason for shifting it, a
loss ought to lie where it falls. The fault principle suggests that
the presence of injurer fault is a good reason for shifting a loss from
the victim to his injurer. Coleman has argued that the fault principle
as a justification for shifting the loss from the victim is a matter
of compensatory justice.2 3 However, as noted above, the principle of
compensatory justice does not require that the faulty injurer bear the
loss; it requires only that the faultless victim be compensated.
What reason might one offer for imposing the victim's loss on the
faulty injurer? Why impose liability upon him? If fault liability is
not a matter of justice, perhaps it is a matter of economics.
For the economist, when a person is at fault he acts in an economi-
24
cally inefficient manner, that is, he imposes risks of harm the costs
of which are greater than the costs of accident avoidance. By imposing
liability on the basis of fault we impose a burden on inefficient conduct
in order to deter it. Liability is imposed on the basis of fault, not
as a requirement of justice but of cost minimization, i.e., as a
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requirement of efficiency. 25 As Coleman has pointed out, the efficiency
account may give a reason for imposing the burden on the faulty injurer,
but it does not explain why the injurer should be made to compensate
his victim. The efficiency argument works equally well if the injurer
is required to render his due to the state or to a charity. In other
words, by itself, the efficiency argument does not account for the
compensatory component in torts.
26
My purpose here is not to determine whether the law of torts is
best understood by the light of moral or economic reason. The point
of the present discussion is more modest. It is that one simply can't
say much that is useful or interesting about the subject unless one is
sensitive to philosophic, legal, economic (and perhaps other) models.
III
While Jurisprudence and Responsibility remain at the forefront
of legal philosophy, they no longer dominate research or teaching in
the field. Courses and literature have appeared on the Abortion Issue,
Medical Ethics, Affirmative Action and the like. In my own case, I
have taught a course on Political Philosophy and the Constitution which
focuses on whether any particular political philosophy is embedded in
the Constitution. The issue arises in the following day. When goods
and services are allocated in a market, it is said that no need arises
to "justify" a particular award or allocation. That X is willing to
pay more than Y for an item suffices, given the market standard, to
justify the distribution. Of course, one can call into question the
morality of using a market to distribute certain goods.
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Government allocaLions, unlike their open market counterparts, are
restricted by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Legislative enactments draw distincti6ns between categories or classes
of persons. For example, the legislation establishing welfare benefits
sets out eligibility requirements; some, but not others, are entitled
to the benefit. The question is always which classifications of inclusion
and exclusion fall within the boundaries of the Equal Protection Clause.
In resolving challenges to legislation on Equal Protection grounds, the
Supreme Court asks whether sufficiently good reasons exist to justify
the classifications; in other words, are there constitutionally acceptable
reasons for awarding, say, a benefit to Smith while denying it to 
Jones.27
Does this practice of the Court commit it in any way to a general political
theory about what kinds of reasons are good ones? If so, is the Con-
stftution itself committed to a particular political theory?
Other fascinating issues emerge under Eminent Domain. The Fifth
Amendment prescribes that the government not take private property for
public use without just compensation. But whatis a taking? If the
local government condemns property, takes title to it, then tears it
down to build a public highway, surely that's a taking. But what if
they don't "touch it;" instead, the city zoning commission rezones the
land so that what was once commercial property is now a refuge for
migrating geese. Suppose that in virtue of this governmental action,
the value of the land diminishes drastically from, say, $100,000 to
$1,000. Has property been taken?
If one argues that in cases like the above, property is taken in
the appropriate sense, then one must rethink the notion of property.
One must begin to view property not in terms of particular holdings
HeinOnline  -- 2 ALSA F. 15 1977
but in terms of "bundles" of user rights instead. Perhaps, property
may be taken even if it remains in its owner's possession if the government
drastically reduces the kinds of user rights to it that one would otherwise
have. These questions suggest that the idea of property must be articulated
as a part of the history of political philosophy and justice.
Legal Philosophy is a young and growing discipline. The .questions
it poses and the answers it gives will be limited only by the people it
attracts. Perhaps this whirlwind tour of its frontiers will help make
it attractive to those it needs most, that is, young scholars committed
to a truly interdisciplinary approach.
(Footnotes are available on request.)
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